By 
By Shamaki Jane Musa
The recent attack on Doma community in Tafoki Ward of Katsina State has once again exposed the dangers and limitations of negotiating peace deals with armed bandits. Despite a locally brokered truce intended to halt violence and restore normalcy, gunmen stormed the community, killing scores of residents, destroying homes, and shattering the fragile confidence that had begun to take root.
The tragedy in Doma, located in Faskari Local Government Area, is not just another grim headline. It is a painful reminder that peace agreements with criminal groups often come at a heavy cost and with no guarantee of sustainability.
The Illusion of Safety
Peace pacts with bandits are often entered into under extreme pressure. Communities exhausted by repeated attacks, kidnappings, and loss of livelihoods understandably seek immediate relief. In many cases, these deals are seen as the only available option where security presence is thin and state response appears overstretched.
However, such agreements can inadvertently legitimize criminal actors. When armed groups are recognized as negotiating partners, they gain leverage, visibility, and, more critically, freer access to the very communities they once terrorized.
Under the guise of “peace,” they are able to move more openly, gather intelligence, identify vulnerable targets, and strike with greater precision if the deal collapses. The Doma attack illustrates this danger starkly. A truce that was meant to protect lives instead preceded one of the deadliest assaults in recent months. The aftermath reveals a troubling pattern: once trust is broken, the violence that follows is often more brutal.
Short-Term Relief, Long-Term Risk
While peace pacts may produce temporary calm, they are fundamentally short-term measures. They do not dismantle the operational capacity of bandit networks. They do not address the arms flow, recruitment channels, or financial incentives that sustain criminality. And most importantly, they provide no enforceable assurance of compliance.
Bandit groups are not conventional political actors bound by formal commitments. Their motivations are largely economic and opportunistic. Without strict accountability mechanisms and sustained security oversight, agreements risk becoming tactical pauses rather than genuine steps toward peace.
In many cases, communities end up paying levies or offering concessions in exchange for “protection.” This can entrench a parallel authority structure, where criminals exercise influence over local governance and daily life. Such dynamics weaken state authority and undermine long-term stability.
The Need for Firm and Coordinated Measures
The repeated collapse of negotiated truces underscores the urgent need for more comprehensive and decisive strategies to end banditry. This requires:
- Strengthened and sustained security operations.
- Improved intelligence gathering and community-based early warning systems.
- Disruption of supply chains for weapons and logistics.
- Protection of vulnerable rural communities through visible and consistent state presence.
- Accountability mechanisms to deter collaboration and impunity.
- True peace cannot be built on fear or compromise with violent actors. It must rest on justice, security, and the restoration of state authority.
A Call for Sustainable Peace
The people of Katsina and communities across the North-West deserve more than temporary ceasefires that can unravel overnight. They deserve durable peace, safety for farmers to return to their fields, children to attend school without fear, and families to sleep without the sound of gunfire in the distance.
Signing peace pacts with bandits may appear pragmatic in moments of crisis, but experience increasingly shows that such arrangements offer no reliable guarantee. Sustainable peace demands stricter, coordinated measures that address the root causes and operational strength of banditry, not accommodations that risk emboldening it.
The lesson from Doma is clear: peace built on fragile promises is not peace at all.
Shamaki Jane Musa, Assistant Research Fellow,, National Conflict Early Warning Early Response System, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja.
